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Abstract
We analyze the incentives for incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms and new
entrants to start an online retail channel in a differentiated goods market. To
this end we set up a two-stage model where firms first decide whether or not
to build the infrastructure necessary to start an online retail channel and then
compete in prices using the channels they have opened up. Consumers trade-off
the convenience of online shopping and the ease to compare prices, with online
uncertainties. Without a threat of entry by a third pure online player we find
that for most parameter constellations firms’ dominant strategy is not to open
an online retail channel as this cannibalizes too much on their conventional
sales. As the cannibalization effect is not present for a pure Internet player,
we show that these firms will start online retail channels under a much wider
range of parameter constellations. The threat of entry may force incumbent
bricks-and-mortar firms to deter entry by starting up an Internet retail channel
themselves. We also show that a low cost of building up an online retail channel
or online shopping conveniences may not be to the benefit of online shopping
as the strategic interaction between firms may be such that no online retail
channel is built when the circumstances seem to be more favourable.
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1 Introduction
The importance of the Internet as a marketplace has substantially grown over the
past decade, even though expectations have been dramatically tempered since early
2000. A distinctive feature of doing business electronically is that transactions no
longer require the physical coordination of buyers and sellers: market participants
find each other at their screens. There are many aspects of market interaction which
are affected by this online nature of trade. On the supply side, we may think of all
kinds of cost reductions, resulting from new ways of organizing production and sales
processes. On the demand side, the major impact of the Internet is on consumers’
ability to acquire information about firms and their prices.
While electronic commerce may have considerable potential, it is still of minor
importance compared to other retail channels even for books and CDs.1 To under-
stand the role of the Internet as a retail channel, we have to explain how its features
influence market behaviour. This paper provides a theoretical framework that ana-
lyzes firms’ incentives to sell online and the extent to which consumers will substitute
the Internet for the conventional retail channel. The interaction between incentives
on both market sides sheds light on the different factors that determine the chan-
nel structure of the industry and the market share of electronic sales. Moreover,
the analysis sheds a new light on the empirical evidence concerning prices on the
electronic channel relative to prices in the conventional retail channel.
For consumers, online shopping makes it easy to find and ‘visit’ firms and com-
pare their prices, but the online nature of the transaction leads to uncertainties. For
example, in some product categories such as clothing and furniture, it is more difficult
to assess how well a particular product fits a consumer’s needs. Other uncertainties
and inconveniences are related to the payment method, poor product declarations,
slow delivery of goods, and unclear redemption policies.2 A consumer weighs the con-
veniences of online shopping with the inconveniences and uncertainties. We explicitly
take this trade-off into account in the consumer’s choice of retail channel.
For firms, the Internet may be used as an alternative retail channel to gain market
1According to a study by the Boston Consulting Group (2000) in the United States and Europe,
e-commerce accounts for less than 5 percent of total sales in the books and CDs categories.
2A survey by Taylor Nelson Sofres (2001) indicates that the most important reason for not
purchasing online is related to payment security and the second most important reason is given by
‘You don’t know what you get.’ and ‘Easier/more fun to buy goods/services in a store.’ In Taylor
Nelson Sofres (2000) it is added that many ”E-commerce web sites ... are not good at making the
shopping experience easy and trustworthy for the online users.”
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share. Moreover, if the online shopping convenience is large enough, firms may try
to exploit the fact that consumers are willing to pay for this convenience by charging
higher prices online. These positive aspects are offset by the fact that online compe-
tition is stronger as it is easier for consumers to compare prices. Moreover, the online
infrastructure and the reorganization of sales processes requires that firms make an
investment upfront. The paper models these different market forces in a consistent
way and attempts to answer which factor is dominant and under what circumstances.
We present a two-stage game in which firms first decide whether to build an online
retail channel before engaging in price competition, using the retail channels at their
disposal. This game is analyzed in a variety of settings where initially there are always
two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms that sell horizontally differentiated products.
Differentiation between firms is modelled a la Hotelling (1929) where firms are located
at opposite sides of a line segment.3 That is, incumbent firms have built a reputation
that appeals more to some consumers than to others. Traditionally, differentiation
between firms in Hotelling type of analyses is either with respect to physical location
and transportation cost or with respect to heterogeneous products and tastes. In
our model, differentiation between the two bricks-and-mortar firms is comprised of
both factors. On the Internet, physical location is not important so that only the
product differentation dimension remains in that retail channel. Accordingly, there
is less differentiation online than in the conventional stores.
We analyse two settings of strategic interaction. The first setting is one where
there is no threat of entry and consumers may or may not experience any additional
convenience from buying online. The second setting we analyze is one where we allow
for a pure online player to threaten the incumbent firms to enter the market and we
investigate the possibilities for entry deterrence. In each setting equilibrium channel
structures and prices are characterized.
Consumers know which of the two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms they prefer
the most. If these firms start an online retail channel, they bring the reputation that
is built up in the conventional stores with them. A pure online player does not have
any reputation among consumers so that consumers have to form expectations about
their position on the product line.
We arrive at the following insights. First, in the absence of a threat of entry and
no additional online shopping convenience, bricks-and-mortar firms do not become
clicks-and-mortar firms. The reason is that a firm with a lower online price (than on
its conventional channel) attracts two types of consumers: those who would otherwise
buy from the rival and those who would otherwise buy form the conventional store
3When we model the consumer’s utility of buying from the entrant, it turns out that it is more
convenient to interpret the line as a circle a la Salop (1979). The difference between the circle
and the line segment is of no further importance, however, and therefore, we prefer to speak about
differentiation along the line.
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of the same firm. The first effect can be called the business-stealing effect, while the
second effect may be termed the cannibalisation effect. We find that the cannibal-
ization effect dominates the business-stealing effect, and hence, firms find it optimal
not to build an online presence as alternative retail channel.
Second, if we allow for online shopping conveniences, some consumers will buy
online even if the online prices are not lower. The cannibalization effect is in this case
weaker as even at identical prices across retail channels, some consumers prefer to
buy online. Moreover, we find that the business-stealing effect is strengthened in case
the other incumbent firm did not open an alternative retail channel. This is because
consumers who are fairly indifferent about the two firms, are more inclined to buy
online than those who have a strong preference for a certain firm. Consequently, if
the convenience of online shopping is high enough, individual firms have an incentive
to start-up an online retail channel. However, if both firms become clicks-and-mortar,
profits are lower than if both had stayed bricks-and-mortar firms. The reason is that
even though some consumers are willing to pay more for a product online than in
the conventional store, online competition for costumers is stronger as there is less
differentiation online. Therefore, online prices will be lower. Depending on the cost of
setting up an online retail channel, different equilibrium configurations are possible.
If the cost is relatively low, firms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma: individually they have
an incentive to start an alternative retail channel, but they are both worse off if
they both do so. For intermediate values of this cost, there is scope for only one
click-and-mortar firm and there is a first-mover advantage of starting an online retail
channel. When the cost is relatively high, none of the two firms will start an online
channel. Interestingly, the only case where online equilibrium prices are higher than
in the conventional store is when there is only one firm selling online and when the
inconvenience associated with shopping online is not too large.
We next look into the possibilities for a pure online player to enter the market.
As an entrant does not eat up its installed costumer base, the incentives for an
entrant to go online are stronger than those of the bricks-and-mortar firms. Indeed,
we find that both in the case where the incumbent firms do not have an online retail
channel and in case they do, an entrant may make positive operating profits. Again,
online prices can only be higher than in the conventional retail channel if firms enjoy
some "monopoly power" online. We then analyze the incentives of both incumbents
and entrants to make a strategic decision to be the first to start an online retail
channel. For intermediate values of the cost of starting up an online retail channel,
we show that an incumbent firm may set up an online infrastructure to deter entry
and that if these costs are even lower, the incumbent firms face a situation of strategic
uncertainty in the sense that they want to take identical strategies: either they want
to jointly deter entry (as this is the way to deter entry) or they both want to remain
a bricks-and-mortar firm.
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In the case where the entrant considers making a strategic decision to be the first
online player, many possible equilibrium reactions by incumbent firms may follow.
This by itself shows the difficult situation online entrants face. Details of the inter-
action matter a lot; details that may be difficult to foresee. One important difficulty
is that when online shopping convenience becomes larger or when the cost of build-
ing an online presence becomes smaller, it may be more profitable for incumbents
to follow an entrant’s decision to build an online retail channel thereby destroying
the profitability of the entrant’s decision. Another difficulty that may arise is that
incumbents may face a coordination problem such that the entrant’s decision to enter
is only profitable if the incumbents solve the problem by not going online themselves.
However, it may well be that the incumbents work out the other solution to the
coordination problem in which case the entrant would have been better off not to
enter in the first place. We see these theoretical possibilities as ways to explain the
difficulties online players have been confronted with in the real world and as possible
reasons why online shopping has not been as successful as it promised to be at the
end of the previous millennium.
The empirical literature on the implications of the Internet for the competitive-
ness of markets has compared average prices in electronic marketplaces against those
in conventional markets. The empirical evidence is mixed. Some studies find that
prices in electronic markets are lower than in conventional markets (see, e.g., Bryn-
jolfsson and Smith (1999)), while others report that prices in electronic markets are
approximately equal to (Clay et al. (2000)) or even higher than in conventional mar-
kets (see, e.g., Lee (1997) and Bailey (1998)). Finally, Friberg et al. (2001) find that
pure online retailers charge lower prices than the online channel of clicks-and-mortar
firms. Our theoretical model provides an explanation for the latter result in terms of
the fact that the online player does not compete with its own conventional store and
therefore has less to loose from charging lower prices online. Our paper attributes the
other mixed empirical evidence concerning conventional and online prices to different
degrees of online market power and differences in online shopping convenience.
On the theoretical side, there are papers by Bakos (1997) and Janssen, Moraga
and Wildenbeest (2005), among others, studying the implications of a reduction in
search cost due to the emergence of online shopping on the competitiveness of mar-
kets. Bakos presents a model of circular product differentiation where consumers
search for prices and product features. In his model, consumers can get to know all
product characteristics if they engage in costly search. In our model, in contrast,
consumers cannot get around some of the uncertainties associated with buying on-
line. Commenting on Bakos’ paper, Harrington, Jr. (2001) questions the validity of
some of Bakos’ results.
There are a few papers addressing the issue of channel substitution. Zettelmeyer
(2000) focuses on the incentives firms have to increase the ease with which consumers
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can evaluate their products. In his paper, consumer search cost is a strategic variable
of firms. He shows that firms may provide selected groups of consumers with different
information (level of search cost), thereby providing monopoly power to the firms
and reducing market competition. The focus of our model is different. The source of
market power in our model lies in the fact that firms sell differentiated products. More
recently, Liu et al. (2003) analyze an issue that is more closely related to the present
paper, namely to what extent can a bricks-and-mortar retailer’s online expansion
affect a pure online player’s entry decision? They find that for some parameter values,
a bricks-and-mortar’s decision to go online may tricker an entrant to go online as well,
making it more profitable for a brick-and-mortar firm not to start an online retail
channel in the first place. To get this result, Liu et al. (2003) assume that firms are
restricted to set identical prices across different retail channels, that there is perfect
competition online between homogeneous goods producing firms and that the pricing
game is sequential. As we study a setting with heterogeneous goods and allow firms
to set different prices across channels, this result cannot occur in our setting.
Lal and Sarvary (1999) pose a different question: When is the Internet likely
to decrease price competition? In their model, the specific inconvenience of online
shopping is that products cannot be evaluated physically to learn about non-digital
attributes. Firms are present on two retail channels. Since digital attributes can be
communicated over the web, the Internet changes the effective search cost structure:
consumers do not have to visit the store to buy their familiar brand, and thus, the
cost of trying another brand is higher than the cost of buying the familiar brand. In
this way, the Internet may increase the effective cost of search, which decreases price
competition.
Finally, Mazón and Pereira (2000) also analyze whether firms have incentives
to open electronic retail channels and the different price equilibria these incentives
generate. However, they focus on different issues such as retail cost reductions and
their results depend crucially on the assumption that some (“old”) consumers do not
have Internet access.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes
equilibrium properties in the absence of a threat of entry. Section 4 discusses the case
of a pure online player threatening to enter. The issue of which market structures
can obtain in equilibrium is discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and managerial
implications are contained in Section 6 and proofs and calculations can be found in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two types of firms. Two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms have estab-
lished a certain brand reputation among consumers, while the possible pure online
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entrant does not have such a reputation. In the first stage of the game, firms decide
whether or not to invest in setting up an online retail channel at fixed cost f . For
the pure online player this decision is equivalent to the decision whether or not to
enter the market. This first stage can be analyzed as a simultaneous move or as a
sequential move game where one or two firms may try to pre-empt the other(s).
In the second stage, there are two (or three) vertically integrated firms on the
supply side of the market. Firms produce the good at constant returns to scale and
production cost is normalized w.l.o.g. to zero. Firms are horizontally differentiated,
as in Hotelling (1929)’s linear city model. On the demand side of the market, there is
a mass of consumers, normalised to 1. Incumbent firms 1 and 2 are located at x = 0
and x = 1, respectively.
Every consumer has a location x on the line segment and the preference for a
firm is represented by the disutility of travelling the distance between the consumer’s
location and the firm. This travel cost consists of two components: the physical travel
cost related to travelling to a firm’s physical shop and the "utility cost" of buying a
good that differs from her most preferred taste. For each unit travelled, consumers
incur a linear cost t > 0. The utility a consumer x gets from buying the product from
firm 1 in its physical shop is given by
v − tx− p1c,
where v is the consumer’s maximal willingness-to-pay4 and p1c is the price firm 1
sets for its conventional retail channel (i.e., its physical shop). Similarly, the utility
consumer x gets from buying the product at firm 2’s physical shop is given by
v − t(1− x)− p2c.
Firm i charges price pic in its store and piE on its electronic retail channel (if it
has one). Consumers purchase at most one unit and to do so they can either go
online, or they can visit one store.5 The advantages and disadvantages of the dif-
ferent retail channels are modelled as follows. A first advantage of buying online is
that consumers can easily compare the firms’ prices. Moreover, the conveniences and
inconveniences/uncertainties of buying on the internet such as poor product declara-
tions and slow delivery of goods are modelled in two steps. First, when buying in a
firm’s online shop, the willingness-to-pay is multiplied by a factor λ. If λ < 1 (λ > 1),
then the consumer’s willing-to-pay is lower (larger) for an online purchase compared
4It is assumed throughout that v is large enough so that the market is covered.
5Here we recognize that, although often suggested otherwise, searching on the Internet does take
time. The equilibria we characterize are such that given the price and product offerings available,
no consumer regrets the choice it has made and, therefore, allowing consumers to visit the Internet
and the conventional channel would not alter the results.
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to a purchase in a conventional store. Second, a consumer does not have to travel to
a firm’s conventional store in order to buy, i.e., he only ”pays” the mismatch between
a firm’s product and his most preferred commodity. This is modelled by multiplying
the cost of ”travelling” to a firm by a factor β, where 0 ≤ β < 1. The parameter β
measures how much of the disutility of buying from firm i is attributed to product
heterogeneity: for example β = 0 implies that products are homogeneous and dif-
ferentiation between incumbent firms is entirely due to differences in their locations,
whereas β = 1 implies that differentiation is entirely due to the heterogeneity of
products. Hence, consumer x derives the following utility from buying from one of
the incumbent firms’ online retail channels:
max[λv − βtx− p1E, λv − βt(1− x)− p2E]
It turns out to be useful to define a parameter α as α = (1 − λ)v/(1 − β)t. The
interpretation of α is straightforward whenever it is positive (λ < 1). If firm 1, resp.
2, sets identical prices in its conventional channel and its online channel, consumer
α, resp. (1− α), is indifferent between buying in the conventional store and buying
online. Another interpretation of α is that it measures the size of the online shopping
inconvenience relative to the inconvenience of having to travel to the conventional
shop. We will assume that −1/2 < α < 1/2.
Since the potential third firm in the market is a newcomer and did not build up
any reputation in its conventional channel, we assume that consumers do not know
the x location of this firm. Each consumer therefore has to ”travel” an expected
distance of 1/2.6 The expected utility of buying from firm 3, a pure Internet player,
is then given by
λv − βt/2− p3E.
An equilibrium of the second stage of the game is a set of prices, one for each retail
channel on which a firm is active, such that each individual firm i maximizes its
profits given the prices set by the other firms. Consumers buy at the firm where
utility is maximized. We will focus on symmetric subgame perfect equilibria of the
two-stage game.
3 No Threat of Entry
In this section we study incentives to open online channels and the subsequent price
competition between two incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms. We study a two stage
6Strictly speaking, this is only true along a circle. Along the line, a consumer’s expected travel to
the Internet player depends on his location and is smaller the closer a consumer is located towards the
middle of the line segment. Working with the proper line segment interpretation only complicates
the analysis without bringing additional insights.
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game in which firms first decide whether or not to sell online, and then compete in
prices. The two incumbent players have both the possibility to open an additional
retail channel, yielding four possible market structures in the second stage. The case
in which neither firm opens an online presence is standard as it confirms the logic of
Hotelling’s (1929) linear city model. It is easy to see that in this case both firms set
their prices equal to t and the two firms share the market equally so that each firm’s
profit is equal to t/2. The case in which only firm 2 sells online is equivalent to the
case in which only firm 1 sells online. This leaves us with two cases to investigate
further.
We first concentrate on the case where each duopolist is a multi-channel retailer.
3.1 Two Clicks-and-Mortar Players
Whenever λ < 17 and the prices (p1c, p1E, p2c, p2E) are in the relevant range, the
picture of channel substitution is as in Figure 1,8 where x1Ec and x2Ec represent the
consumer that is indifferent between buying from a respective firm’s conventional and
online channel and x1E2E represent the consumer that is indifferent between buying
from the two online channels. One can easily calculate that
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t ;x2Ec = 1−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p2E)
(1− β)t ;x1E2E =
βt− (p1E − p2E)
2βt
.
In this picture, the area to the left of x1Ec forms the demand for firm 1’s con-
ventional channel, while the area between x1Ec and x1E2E constitutes the consumers
who buy via firm 1’s online channel. Mirror areas represent Firm 2’s demand on its
conventional and online channel, respectively. From Figure 1 it is clear that the profit
function for firm 1 is given by:
π1 = p1cx1Ec + p1E(xEE − x1Ec)
=
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E
βt− (p1E − p2E)
2βt
.
A similar equation holds for firm 2. The equation has a simple interpretation. By
means of its online channel, a firm competes with the other firm to get a larger
market share. The division of a firm’s market share between the conventional and
7The main reason why we focus in the text mostly on this case is that the expressions that hold
true when λ > 1 are less complicated and easily follow once the case λ < 1 is clearly understood.
Also, one may argue that this is the most natural case to look at as the main advantage of shopping
online, the fact that one does not incur geographical travelling cost, is already captured by the
parameter β.
8Here, it is implicitly assumed that equilibrium prices are such that all channels by all firms are
visited by at least some consumers. Below, we will specify the parameters for which this is the case.
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Figure 1: Two clicks-and-mortar players
the electronic channel is entirely determined by a firm’s internal pricing policy: a
firm has some monopoly power over the consumers who buy from them and can set
the price difference p1c − p1E so as to maximize profits. It is easy to see then that
whenever all channels are visited by some consumers, equilibrium prices are given by:
p1E = p2E = βt
p1c = p2c = βt+
(1− λ)v
2
and the equilibrium indifferent consumers are given by
x∗1Ec =
(1− λ)v
2(1− β)t ;x
∗
2Ec = 1−
(1− λ)v
2(1− β)t ;x
∗
EE = 1/2.
As it has to be the case that 0 ≤ x1Ec ≤ 1/2, it follows that this equilibrium
holds whenever 0 < (1 − λ)v ≤ (1 − β)t, or given the restrictions we have imposed
on α, whenever α is positive.9 The Proposition below summarizes the above and also
considers the case where α < 0.
Proposition 1 When both firms have built the infrastructure to sell online, there are
9One may observe that many relevant expressions in this paper, like the ones here for the indif-
ferent consumers (in equilibrium), include a term like (1 − λ)v/(1 − β)t. One of the advantages of
defining α in the way we did is that one does not have to impose each time additional and different
restrictions on β (to have it bounded away from 1). One should note, however, that given the values
of the other parameters, α negatively depends on β and in particular that α is close to 0 whenever
β is close to 1.
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three cases to consider: (a) if α ≤ 0, all consumers will buy online, p1E = p2E = βt,
and equilibrium profits will be βt/2; (b) if α > 0, all retail channels will be used and
p1E = p2E = βt, p1c = p2c = βt+
(1−λ)v
2
and equilibrium profits will be βt/2+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t .
Proposition 1 is easily understood by taking the Hotelling result as a reference
point and therefore, a more formal proof is omitted. If Internet purchases are consid-
ered to be relatively inconvenient overall (α > 0), firms use both channels. Competi-
tion between the firms mostly takes the form of competition online as the consumer
that is indifferent between buying from the two firms is a consumer that buys online.
The online prices that result are exactly equal to the equilibrium prices in a Hotelling
model where transportation costs are equal to βt (the online "transportation costs").
When both firms are clicks-and-mortar firms, online prices are always lower than
prices in the conventional channel. More precisely, conventional prices are set as a
monopoly mark-up on the online prices: there is no effective competition for these
inframarginal consumers and firms will use their monopoly power over these con-
sumers. This also helps to explain the result in case online purchases are considered
to be more convenient (α < 0). In this case, firms have to set lower conventional
prices than online prices to motivate consumers to buy in their conventional stores.
From the discussion provided above for the case α > 0 it follows that this cannot
be profit maximizing. Therefore, we get a situation where the online retail channel
dominates all sales. As online ”transportation costs” are lower, competition is more
severe and prices are lower than when firms compete with their conventional stores.
As competition online is more severe, we can therefore arrive at a preliminary
conclusion that it is not in the interest of incumbent bricks-and-mortar firms to make
the online shopping experience very convenient.
3.2 Clicks-and-Mortar vs. Bricks-and-Mortar
When one firm (say firm 1) has opened an electronic retail channel and the other
has decided not to do so, the picture of channel substitution for the relevant range
of prices and parameter values is as in Figure 2, where
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t ;x1E2c =
t− (1− λ)v + (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
.10
In this picture, the segment to the left of x1Ec forms the demand for firm 1’s conven-
tional channel, while the segment between x1Ec and x1E2c constitutes the consumers
who buy via firm 1’s Internet channel.
The remaining segment represents firm 2’s demand on its conventional channel.
11
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Figure 2: Clicks-and-mortar vs. bricks-and-mortar
Using Figure 2 the profit function for firms 1 and 2 are given by:
π1 = p1cx1Ec + p1E(x1E2c − x1Ec)
=
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E
t− (1− λ)v + (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
;
π2 = p2cx1E2c = p2c
βt+ (1− λ)v − (p2c − p1E)
(1 + β)t
.
The first-order conditions that yield the subgame perfect equilibrium prices are given
in the Appendix. Solving these equations and substituting them back into the profit
function given above gives the Proposition below.
Proposition 2 Suppose one firm has decided to build the infrastructure to sell online,
say firm 1, and firm 2 has not. Then, if λ < 1,11 the unique symmetric subgame
equilibrium prices are given by
p1c =
(4 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v
6
;
p2c =
(1 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v
3
;
p1E =
(2 + β)t− (1− λ)v
3
,
11In case λ > 1, firm 1 will not use its conventional channel, the remaining two equilibrium
prices will not be affected and equilibrium profits are simply given by π1 =
[(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t and
π2 =
[(1+2β)t+(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t .
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and equilibrium profits equal
π1 =
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t +
[(2 + β)t− (1− λ)v]2
9(1 + β)t
;
π2 =
[(1 + 2β)t+ (1− λ)v]2
9(1 + β)t
.
There are a few interesting observations to make. First, if only one firm opens an
electronic retail channel, it will set higher prices online than the other firm with its
conventional and it may even set higher prices online than the average conventional
price. The first point follows as (1 − β)t > 2(1 − λ)v whenever α < 1/2 and is
explained by the fact that the clicks-and-mortar firm exploits its monopoly position
online. The second point holds true whenever α < 1/5 and is explained by the fact
that in this case the online inconveniences are considered to be fairly small (or non-
existent in case α < 0) so that the clicks-and-mortar firm can further exploit its
online monopoly position. A second observation is that the operating profits of the
clicks-and-mortar firm are always higher than those of the bricks-and-mortar firm.
Finally, both the online and the conventional prices of the clicks-and-mortar firm
are lower than in case both firms had stayed out of online retailing altogether. The
main reason for this is that the bricks-and-mortar firm considers the online channel
of its competitor more aggressive than the competitor’s conventional retail channel.
In reaction, it will price lower, which forces the clicks-and-mortar firm also to lower
its price.
3.3 Clicks or just Bricks?
In the previous two subsections we have characterized the price equilibria of the
second stage of the game. We now go one step back and analyze the first stage
decision whether or not to build an online retail infrastructure. The above analysis
can be summarized in the payoff matrix below (for the case where λ < 1),12 where
because of symmetry only the pay-offs of firm 1 are mentioned.
2
1
y/n n y
n t
2
[(1−λ)v+(1+2β)t]2
9(1+β)t
y [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t +
[(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9(1+β)t − f
βt
2
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f
.
Table 1. Pay-offs for firm 1 depending on whether or not itself and its rival
incumbent start an online channel and given that a pure online retailer stays out of
12It follows from the analysis above that the pay-off matrix in case λ > 1 differs only to the extent
that the term [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t is missing in both cells in the bottom row of the matrix.
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the market.
A firm contemplating to attract additional consumers via its online retail channel
has to trade-off two effects. First, it will steal some consumers away from its com-
petitor, but at the expense of lower overall prices. Moreover, the online channel also
steals consumers from its own conventional store. The calculations in the Appendix
and Figure 3 below show that unless α is a relatively large negative number the first,
business-stealing, effect is weaker than the second, cannibalization, effect. In fact,
the Appendix and Figure 3 show that for many parameter constellations the firms
have a dominant strategy not to open an online channel. This implies that without
a threat of entry, incumbent firms will not find it profitable to start an online retail
channel for most parameter values. It is interesting to observe that this result holds
true even if f , the cost of starting such a retail channel, is very small.
If α is a relatively large negative number and f is small enough,13 a firm may
be better off having an online channel and the situation where both firms did not
build an online retail channel cannot arise in equilibrium. Two cases may result.
First, for a range of parameters where α is not close to −1/2 when β takes on middle
range values (see the picture below for an example), there exist asymmetric equilibria
where only one firm opens an online channel. In this case one firm effectively uses
only its online retail channel, while the other firm uses the only channel it has, the
conventional one. Online prices in this case will be higher than offline prices. If α
is quite close to −1/2 and β is not close 0 or to 1, firms face a Prisoner’s Dilemma:
both firms have a dominant strategy to build on online channel and to use it as their
only effective retailing channel, but as competition online is more severe than off-line
competition, both firms would be better off if they had not opened an online channel!
The possible equilibrium configurations are summarized in Figure 3 below for the
case when f/t = 0.01. The Figure shows for which parameter constellations, which
equilibrium structure arises. The Figure shows that the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation
described above cannot arise when β is close to 0. In this case, locational differences
are the main source of product differentiation, hence online competition is very severe.
In this case, firms want to avoid both having an online presence. When β is close
to 1, differences between firms are due to differences in the products they sell and
in this case firms cannot benefit from an online presence, no matter how large the
online shopping conveniences are! In this case without a threat of entry, geographical
differences between shops and the consumer cost of travelling associated with it are
thus important features explaining whether or not firms will start an online retail
channel. Note also that on average firms are worse off, or not better off, if online
shopping conveniences increase (α decreases). This is easily seen in the two regions
where a symmetric equilibrium exists. In the asymmetric equilibrium case, one can
13Of course, when f is relatively large, it is never optimal to build an online channel.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium structures when no threat of entry, f/t = 0.01.
easily show that the average pay-off, relevant if firms do not know which one of them
will be the one with an online presence, is declining in α.
4 Threat of Entry by a pure Internet player
We now turn to the role the Internet can play as an alternative marketing and distri-
bution channel in case a pure online retailer threatens to enter the market. We are
interested in the incentives to enter and in the question whether the two conventional
firms have an incentive to start operating an Internet channel in view of this threat
of entry. Assuming the entrant enters, there are three relevant situations to consider
depending on how many incumbent firms open an online channel: no incumbent firm
sells online, one incumbent sells online or both incumbents sell online. Each of these
three cases is analyzed in turn in the next Subsections. The case where the entrant,
firm 3, decides not to enter is analyzed in the previous section.
4.1 Bricks-and-Mortar vs. Pure Internet Retailer
We first consider the subgame where the two incumbent firms have not built the
infrastructure to sell online, while the entrant has done so and uses the online channel
as the sole retail channel. In this case, it is easy to see that for the set of relevant
15
prices, the indifferent consumers are given by the following expressions:
x1c3E =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E) + βt2
t
;x2c3E = 1−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p2E) + βt2
t
,
where for example x1c3E denotes the consumer who is indifferent between buying
from firm 1’s conventional store and the entrant’s (firm 3’s) online store. Consumers
located to the left of x1c3E buy from firm 1’s conventional store, those located to the
right of x2c3E buy from firm 2’s conventional store and those located between x1c3E
and x2c3E buy from the entrant’s online store. Given these indifferent consumers, one
can easily derive the firms’ profit functions.
Proposition 3 When the two incumbent firms have committed not to use the Inter-
net channel and a pure internet retailer has entered, the subgame equilibrium prices
are given by14
p1c = p2c =
(1 + β)t+ 2(1− λ)v
6
p3E =
(1− 1
2
β)t− (1− λ)v
3
.
Operating profits are given by
π1 = π2 =
[(1− λ)v + (1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9t
π3 =
2[(1− 1
2
β)t− (1− λ)v]2
9t
The Proposition shows that entry by a pure online retailer forces incumbent bricks-
and-mortar firms to lower their prices considerably: straightforward calculations show
that the subgame perfect equilibrium prices are smaller than t
2
implying that they are
more than two times smaller than without the presence of the pure online retailer. In
this case, the entrant has a monopoly position online and because of this may even
enter with higher prices than the incumbent firms who have an established reputation.
Online prices are larger whenever (2−β)t−2(1−λ)v > (1+β)t+2(1−λ)v. This can
be rewritten as: α < 1−2β
4(1−β) . This inequality is satisfied whenever α and β are both
relatively small, i.e., in sectors where the online inconvenience is perceived to be fairly
small (or online shopping is considered to be more convenient) and products are close
substitutes. This has a clear economic significance. In case β is small, consumers do
not have a clear preference for one of the incumbents’ brands; they mainly dislike
travelling to the conventional shop. The online retailer benefits in case the online
shopping convenience is not too bad. Note that it is in the interest of the entrant to
increase online shopping convenience if possible.
14Note that equilibrium prices are nonnegative for −1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1/2.
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Figure 4: Clicks-and-mortar vs. pure Internet retailer.
4.2 Clicks-and-Mortar vs. Pure Internet Retailer
Let us now consider the case where all firms opened the possibility of selling through
the online channel. In case λ < 1, Figure 4 applies for relevant values of the para-
meters and prices, where (in addition to the notation used earlier) x1E3E denotes the
consumer who is indifferent between buying from the online channel of firm 1 and the
online channel of firm 3. Consumers located relatively close to 1/2 buy from firm 3.
As firms 1 and 2 are symmetric with respect to each other, we only concentrate
on firm 1. Using this notation and the figure one can derive that the indifferent
consumers are given by
x1Ec =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t and x1E3E =
1
2
− p1E − p3E
βt
.
Using these equations and the derivations in the Appendix, we can state the following
Proposition.
Proposition 4 If λ < 1,15 the unique symmetric subgame equilibrium prices are as
follows in case all three firms have opened an online retail channel :
p1E = p2E =
βt
3
(1)
p1c = p2c =
βt
3
+
(1− λ)v
2
, (2)
15In case λ > 1, it easily follows that the conventional channel will not be used by the incumbent
firms and the equilibrium profits of these firms will be simply βt/9. All other expressions remain the
same.
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and
p3E =
βt
6
. (3)
Some consumers buy via the incumbents Internet channel. Operating profits are given
by
π1 = π2 =
βt
9
+
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t
π3 =
βt
18
.
With three retailers with online presence, online prices are lower than prices in
the conventional retail channel. Moreover, the fact that pure online retailers do not
have an established reputation, forces them to gain market share by setting quite low
prices: their equilibrium prices are just half of the online prices of incumbent firms
and these are again lower than their conventional prices. Also, when β is close to 0,
online prices are close to 0 as well: in this case, products are almost homogeneous
and due to a lack of locational difference, online competition is very severe.16
4.3 Asymmetric Incumbents
The last case to consider in the presence of entry is when one incumbent has set up
an online retail channel, say firm 1, and the other has not. The profit functions in
this case are given by the following equations:
π1 =
(1− λ)v − (p1c − p1E)
(1− β)t (p1c − p1E) + p1E(
1
2
− p1E − p3E
βt
);
π2 =
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p3E) + βt2
t
p2c;
π3 = [
1
2
−
(1− λ)v − (p2c − p3E) + βt2
t
+
p1E − p3E
βt
]p3E;
Using the derivations in the Appendix, we can state the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 In the asymmetric case where only incumbent firm 1 and the en-
trant have an online retail channel and firm 2 not, the unique symmetric subgame
16It is easy to see that x1Ec ≤ 1/3 whenever α ≤ 2/3, which is always satisfied given the assump-
tion on α we imposed.
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equilibrium prices are, in case λ < 1,17 given by:
p1E =
β
1 + β
[
(3 + β)t
6
− (1− λ)v
6
]; (4)
p1c = p2c =
β
1 + β
(3 + β)t
6
+
3 + 2β
1 + β
(1− λ)v
6
; (5)
and
p3E =
β
1 + β
[
(3− β)t
6
− (1− λ)v
3
]. (6)
Operating profits in this case are given by
π1 =
[(1− λ)v]2
4(1− β)t +
β
36(1 + β)2t
[(3 + β)t− (1− λ)v]2;
π2 =
1
36(1 + β)2t
[(3β + β2)t+ (3 + 2β)(1− λ)v]2;
π3 =
β
36(1 + β)t
[(3− β)t− 2(1− λ)v]2.
With asymmetric incumbent firms there are again some interesting results that
deserve some further elaboration. First, in case online shopping is considered to be
less convenient (α > 0) both incumbents charge the same equilibrium offline price.
This price is simply equal to the online price plus the mark-up (1−λ)v
2
we have seen
in previous cases. Second, the entrant’s online price can never be larger than the
incumbent’s online price. From equations (4) and (6) one can conclude that the
entrant’s online price is larger in case 2β + α(1 − β) < 0. However, in this case
the condition that p2c ≥ 0 is violated, implying that the equilibrium online prices of
both firms equal βt/2 (see footnote 17). We can therefore conclude already that the
entrant’s (online) prices can only be larger than the incumbents’ prices in case the
entrant has a monopoly position online, the case examined in subsection 4.1.
17When λ > 1, there are two subcases two consider. In both cases, as before, the incumbent firm
with an online channel decides not to use its conventional retail channel implying equation (5) stops
being relevant. The first subcase arises when the expression for p2c remains positive. This is the case
as long as α(3+2β)(1−β)+β(3+β) > 0. Apart from the fact that we have to delete the expression
[(1−λ)v]2
4(1−β)t in the equilibrium profits of the incumbent, all other expressions remain unchanged. When
α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) < 0, firm 2 cannot make positive profits and drops out of the market
altogether. One can easily check that in this case, the equilibrium prices are p1E = p3E = βt/2 and
equilibrium pofits are given by π1 = π3 = βt/4. One may easily verify that given the condition on
α and β, even the consumer located at 1 prefers buying from the entrant at this price (yielding a
pay-off of λv − βt) to getting the good for free from firm 2 (yielding a pay-off of v).
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5 Equilibrium Market Structures: Only Bricks or
also Clicks?
We now analyze the first stage of the game and ask the question what are the in-
centives of firms to develop an infrastructure to sell online at a fixed cost f. In other
words, under what conditions on the exogeneous parameters can which of the above
market structures arise? We consider two different ways the first stage may be played.
First, we analyze the case where the incumbents decide whether or not to start an
online channel before the entrant does. Here, we ask the question whether starting
an online channel may be a way to deter a pure online player to enter. Second, we
analyze the case where the entrant decides whether or not to start an online channel
before the incumbents do.
Before we delve into the implications of these two different decision sequences, we
provide some analysis that is used in both cases. We first summarize the pay-offs
in the different cases where the entrant always enters in the following two matrices,
where due to the symmetry between firm 1 and 2, we have only one matrix for both
of them.18
2
1
y/n n y
n [(1−λ)v+(
1
2
+1
2
β)t]2
9t
[(3β+β2)t+(3+2β)(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t
y [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t +
β[(3+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t − f
βt
9
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f
,
Table 2. Pay-offs for firm 1 in case λ < 1 depending on whether or not itself and its
rival incumbent start an online channel and given that a pure online retailer enters.19
2
1
y/n n y
n 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9t − f
β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)t − f
y β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]
2
36(1+β)t − f
βt
18
− f
,
Table 3. Pay-offs for firm 3 in case λ < 1 depending on which of the incumbent
firms starts an online channel and given that itself enters.20
18Note that the cells are defined in terms of the actions taken by firms 1 and 2. Hence, this is not
a proper pay-off matrix.
19In case λ > 1 the term [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t has to be deleted from the two cells in the bottom row. In case
λ > 1 and, in addition, α(3+2β)(1−β)+β(3+β) < 0, the bottom left cell will have to be replaced
by βt/4− f (see footnote 17) and the upper right cell becomes zero.
20In case λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1 − β) + β(3 + β) > 0, the expressions remain identical. In case
λ > 1 and α(3+2β)(1−β)+β(3+β) < 0, the bottom left cell will have to be replaced by βt/4− f
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Figure 5: Incentives for firm 3 to enter, α = 0.4.
On the basis of Table 3, we can easily argue that firm 3’s incentive to enter are
monotone in the number of firms that have an online channel: the more incumbents
have an online retail channel, the less operating profits a pure online retailer can
get.21
Looking at the matrices, one can see that the parameters λ and v only enter
together in the combination (1 − λ)v. Using the definition of α we can therefore
substitute this expression without loss of generality for α(1−β)t, where α is relatively
small (large) when the shopping inconvenience or the willingness-to-pay is relatively
small. Once the substitution is made, one can also see that all operating profits are
linear in t so that in fact we are left with three relevant parameters: α, β and f/t.
Figure 5 shows for α = 0.4, the monotonicity of the incentives of firm 3 to enter: for
any β, if f/t is relatively large firm 3 will never enter even, not even if no incumbent
has built the facilities to sell online. If f/t becomes smaller we first enter an area of
parameter values in which firm 3 can only profitably enter when no incumbent firm
has an online retail channel. If f/t becomes even smaller we next enter an area of
parameter values in which firm 3 can only profitably enter if at most one incumbent
firm has an online retail channel. Finally, if f/t is very small firm 3 will always want
to enter.
(see footnote 17).
21See the Appendix for the calculations.
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5.1 Online Retailing as an Entry Deterrence Strategy
We first consider whether or not incumbent firms have an incentive to make a strategic
move by opening an online retail channel first. We have seen that in the absence of
an entry threat the incentives to open an online channel are limited to the case where
the online shopping conveniences are relatively large. By looking at the case where
incumbents decide first whether or not to start an online retail channel before a pure
online player decides to enter the market, we therefore inquire whether the possibility
to deter entry gives incumbent firms more incentives to open online retail channels.
The analysis of this section is facilitated by the fact presented above that the entrant’s
incentives to enter are monotonic in the number of incumbent firms having an online
retail channel at their disposal. It turns out that in line with Figure 5, there are
four possible cases for the entrant’s reaction to the incumbents’ online presence. To
discuss these cases in an easy way, we denote by πi(a, b, c) the total pay-off (including
the cost f of opening an online channel) of player i when player 1, 2 and 3 take
decisions a, b and c respectively, where a, b and c are either equal to n (not to start
an online retail channel) or y (start an online channel).
First, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel are relatively high,
π3(n, n, y) < 0, the entrant will never enter. In the appendix we show that if the
costs are really that high that an entrant will never enter, then incumbents will also
not start an online channel. In other words, the incentives to start an online retail
channel are larger for a pure online entrant than for an incumbent. This is easily
explained by the fact that an incumbent partially competes with its own conventional
store when it sets up its own online channel.
Second, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is somewhat smaller,
π3(n, n, y) > 0 > π3(y, n, y), the entrant will enter if, and only if no incumbent firm
has started an electronic channel. In the appendix it is shown that in this case the
only subgame perfect equilibrium has one incumbent incurring the cost of starting
an online retail channel. Depending on the parameters, the incumbent firms then
may face a free-rider problem whenever both of them prefer the other to incur the
cost of deterring entry. Free riding may occur for example when β is close to 1 and
α is close to 0 so that product differentiation is mostly due to product heterogeneity
and if there is an online shopping inconvenience, it is fairly small. As we have seen
in Section 3, online prices may be higher in this market structure (when α is small)
than average conventional prices due to the fact that one of the incumbents has some
online monopoly power. Unlike in Section 3, this market structure may now also arise
when α > 0 as incumbent firms have an incentive to deter entry.
Third, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is even smaller, π3(y, n, y)
> 0 > π3(y, y, y), the entrant will enter if and only if, at most one incumbent firm
has started an electronic channel. The appendix shows that in this case two things
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may happen. The more interesting possibility occurs when α > 0 and it may also
arise when α is not too small. In this case, the incumbent firms face a situation of
severe strategic uncertainty in the sense that they only would like to start an online
retail channel if the other firm will do likewise so that they together deter entry. This
strategic uncertainty is reflected by the fact that the incumbent firms face a coor-
dination game and there are two subgame perfect equilibria: either they both start
an online retail channel and together deter entry, or none of them builds an online
channel and entry occurs. When entry occurs, as explained in subsection 4.1., online
prices may be higher than the prices in the conventional stores due to the "monopoly
power" of the entrant. When there are large online shopping conveniences, only
one online shop owned by the entrant is a very big threat to the incumbents and
it becomes a dominant strategy for the incumbent firms to start an online channel
irrespective of the behavior of the other incumbent. The net effect in this case is that
entry is deterred.
Fourth, if the cost of setting up an electronic retail channel is very small, f < βt
18
,
the entrant will always enter. If the cost of setting up the online retail channel is
really very low, it may be (as a subcase) that both incumbent firms nevertheless
decide to go online, sometimes even when α > 0. Hence, even if entry does occur it
may facilitate incumbents also to start an online retail channel as without entry they
would not do so.
An overview of the different cases presented in this subsection is given in (α, β)
space in Figure 6 below. The vertical line in the Figure represents the boundary
between a region where the entrant always enters (to the right) and a region where
the entrant’s decision is conditional on what incumbents do. In the left-hand part
of the Figure we see the different possibilities to deter entry (either by one firm, or
jointly as part of a coordination game or due to dominant strategies) as discussed
above. The right-hand part shows that when α decreases it becomes more attractive
for incumbents to start an online retail channel as well even though this will not affect
the entrant’s choice.
5.2 Following the entrant’s lead
Next, we analyze the case where the entrant is considering whether or not to make a
strategic move and invest already early on (i.e., before the incumbents consider doing
so) in building an online retail channel. More formally, the entrant now decides first
whether or not to enter before the incumbents decide whether or not they follow and
start their own retail channel. Of the cases considered in the previous subsection,
the first and the last case (π3(n, n, y) < 0 and π3(y, y, y) > 0) are very similar to the
previous analysis where the incumbents decide first and are therefore omitted. So,
we concentrate on the intermediate cases where π3(n, n, y) > 0 > π3(y, y, y).
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Figure 6: Equilibrium structures, f/t = 0.02.
Unlike in the previous subsection, now many possibilities arise and we don’t at-
tempt to give a complete characterization. The most obvious cases arise when the
incumbents have a dominant strategy either to start or not to start an online channel
after the entrant has decided to enter. For quite a few parameter values when α > 0,
the incumbents have a dominant strategy not too follow the entrant and the market
outcome is one where the entrant is the only one having online presence. On the
other hand, when α is relatively small, there are many parameters values (especially
when β is not too close to 0) for which the incumbents have a dominant strategy
also to start an online retail channel whenever the entrant has done so. In this case,
the entrant is better off not to start an online channel when π3(y, y, y) < 0.Whether
or not the incumbents will then set up an online channel depends on the specific
parameter values and this case is already analyzed in section 3.3.
There are, however, also quite a few other more interesting situations that may
occur. First, it may be that the incumbents face a situation of strategic uncertainty,
formally represented by a coordination game, following the entrant’s decision to go
online. This is for example the case in an area around the following parameter
constellation: α = 0, β = 0.1 and f/t = 0.007. The incumbent firms would either
like to enter both or not at all as π1(y, y, y) > π1(n, y, y) and π1(n, n, y) > π1(y, n, y).
Turning back to the decision of the entrant makes clear that when the incumbents face
a coordination problem, the entrant also faces a very risky decision: if incumbents
will not follow, it can make a profit starting an online channel as π3(n, n, y) > 0.
24
However, if incumbents follow suit, the entrant cannot recover its start-up costs
and goes bankrupt as π3(y, y, y) < 0. As the entrant cannot logically predict what
the incumbents will do, as both possibilities may occur as equilibrium responses,
the entrant cannot really figure out what to do. We may interpret this theoretical
possibility as one of the possible rational explanations for the shake-out we have
seen in recent years in the online business world: Entrants may have expected that
incumbent brick-and-mortar firms will not follow and they had good reasons to expect
so as not going online is an equilibrium response by incumbent firms. However, there
exists another equilibrium path where incumbents do go online and where entrants
make losses. The model tells that this possibility arises when both α and β are
close to 0, i.e., when the online shopping inconvenience is fairly small and goods are
relatively homogeneous. Interestingly, these are exactly the sectors where one may
expect online retailing to be quite successful!
A second interesting observation is that the number of firms deciding to start
an online retail channel may very well be non-monotonic in the cost of building
the infrastructure to sell online. The following parameter constellation serves as an
example. For α = 0, β = 0.3 and f/t = 0.10, it is optimal for the entrant to enter
and start a pure online shop as π3(n, n, y) > 0, knowing that the incumbents will not
follow suit as π1(y, n, y) < π1(n, n, y) and π1(y, y, y) < π1(n, y, y) . However, when
f/t drops to f/t = 0.05, ceteris paribus, one incumbent will find it optimal also to
start an online retail channel following the entrant’s decision to do so as π1(y, n, y) >
π1(n, n, y). This, however, makes it unprofitable for the entrant to start an online
retail channel in the first place as π3(y, n, y) < 0. When the entrant does in fact
abstain from entering (as it is able to accurately predict the incumbent’s response),
the incumbents will find it optimal not to start an online channel themselves. Thus,
when f/t = 0.05, no online retail channel is built: the threat to enter in this case is,
in a sense, incredible in case the incumbents can respond by going online themselves!
When the cost of building an online retail channel falls further to, for example,
f/t = 0.03 the entrant will find it optimal to enter again (π3(n, n, y) > 0) even if
it knows that an incumbent will do likewise.22 Thus, this numerical example shows
that it is not generally true that by subsidizing the building of online retail channels,
more online retail channels will be built.
A similar situation may arise with respect to the online shopping convenience
perceived by the consumers. For α = 0, β = 0.4 and f/t = 0.07, it is optimal for the
entrant to enter and start a pure online shop, knowing that the incumbents will not
follow suit. However, when the online shopping inconvenience drops to α = −0.3,
22The implicit point in the above discussion is that for some parameter configurations the in-
cumbent’s decision to go online is positively affected by the entrant’s presence online. This can be
explained by the fact that by doing so an incumbent will want to recover some of the business it
has lost to the entrant.
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keeping the other parameter values equal, one incumbent will find it optimal to go
online as well, making the entrant’s decision to do so unprofitable. As above, when
the entrant does not enter in the first place, the incumbents will not go online at all.
This makes the point that it is not generally true that increasing the online shopping
convenience as perceived by consumers, will increase the possibility that firms build
an online presence. Hence, increasing online shopping convenience may actually not
be in the interest of consumers!
6 Conclusions and Managerial Implications
In this paper we have explored the implications of the possibility for firms of building
a retail channel online. The setting we analyze is one where two incumbent firms
compete for costumers in a market with horizontally differentiated products. Firms
are differentiated because they sell differentiated products and because their physical
locations are different. In the online market, only the first type of differentiation
plays a role. Consumers know which of the two incumbent firms sell products closest
to their tastes. They can decide to go either to the conventional store of a firm or
they can go online. Consumers find one aspect of online shopping certainly better
than conventional shopping, which is the fact that they do not have to travel a
physical distance. Apart from that, consumers may find online shopping more or less
convenient from going to a conventional shop depending on whether or not they feel
confident about things like payment method, delivery time and the thrustworthiness
of redemption policies.
Firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage they decide whether or not to build
the infrastructure needed to sell online at a fixed cost. The interesting cases arise
when this fixed cost is not prohibitively high so as to make it unprofitable to start an
online retail channel. The main question at this stage is what are the incentives for
a bricks-and-mortar firm to go online and what are the incentives to enter for a pure
online player. In the second stage, firms decide which prices to charge on different
retail channels.
The more interesting managerial implications are as follows. First, bricks-and-
mortar firms are worse off if they open an online retail channel as the cannibalization
effect (stealing consumers from its own conventional store at lower prices) is likely
to be more important than the business stealing effect (attracting demand from rival
firms). When online shopping is considered to carry some conveniences, incumbent
firms also will not have an incentive to start an online retail channel. When there
are large online shopping conveniences, firms may individually have an incentive to
go online, but total profits decline as online competition is more severe due to the
absence of differentiation in location. In some cases, firms may in fact face a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
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A second managerial implication relates to the question who benefits from online
shopping conveniences. By increasing the online shopping conveniences (or reducing
the inconveniences), firms are able to direct more of their costumers through the on-
line channel. If there are no important cost advantages related to this shift and there
is no (threat of) entry, incumbent firms will be worse off as more bricks-and-mortar
firms will open an online retail channel and competitive pressure online is larger.
When there is a threat of entry, however, increasing online shopping convenience
may be a way for incumbent firms to credibly commit to start an online channel if
pure only players do so. In such situations, online players may abstain from entry
as entry will be followed by an incumbent going online, making the entry unprof-
itable. These are situations where incumbent firms may benefit from online shopping
conveniences at the expense of entrants and consumers.
A third implication relates to the viability of pure online retailers. Our analysis
shows that in most circumstances these retailers have to charge fairly low prices in
order to get a fair market share. The operating profits of online retailers are therefore
relatively low as they do not benefit from a bricks-and-mortar reputation. Moreover,
they may find it difficult to predict the response of incumbent firms to their entering
the market. There are situations when incumbent firms face a coordination problem
after entry. This makes the entry decision a risky decision as the consequences in
terms of profitability are difficult to predict. Moreover, it may be that incumbent
firms will face lower cost of building up an online retail channel as they may learn
from the entrant’s experience. We have seen how sensitive the entrant’s decision
problem is to the non-monotonicity in the cost of building an online retail channel.
All these factors question the viability of pure online retailers, especially in markets
where product differentiation is largely due to the geographical location of bricks-
and-mortar firms.
A last managerial implication relates to a firm’s pricing policy. Online prices
depend on the type of firm: a clicks-and-mortar firm charges higher online prices
than a pure online player. Also, online prices depend on the market structure and on
the size of the online shopping convenience. Online prices will only be higher than
prices in the conventional stores if firms have some market power online, which is
partly founded by the size of the online shopping convenience. In future research
it would be interesting to see whether this theoretical prediction can be empirically
verified.
The results may explain the fact that online shopping has not become as important
a retail channel as many believed at the end of the previous millennium. The online
shop may cannibalize a firm’s own costumer base and when it does not, it may increase
competition between firms if everyone builds an online retail channel. Managers
should be aware of these facts and should weigh the importance of them against the
possibility that new costumers are attracted to the market by using an alternative
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retail channel. In future theoretical work, it would be interesting to see to what
extent the conclusion drawn here for a more or less saturated market continue to
hold when the online retail channel is able to attract new costumers.
7 Appendix
First-order conditions Section 3.2.
There are three first-order conditions, one for firm 2 and two for firm 1:
p1c = p1E +
(1− λ)v
2
;
0 = t− (1− λ)v + p2c − 2p1E;
0 = βt− (1− λ)v − 2p2c + p1E;
Solving these three equations for the three unknown prices, yield the subgame
equilibrium prices given in the main text.
Calculations establishing firms have a dominant strategy in Section 3.3 when λ < 1
When firm 2 does not start an online channel, it is better for firm 1 to do likewise
iff
1
2
≥ α
2(1− β)
4
+
[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2
9(1 + β)
− f/t.
This inequality certainly holds if it holds for f = 0. In this case, the inequality can
be rewritten as
18(1 + β) ≥ 9α2(1− β2) + 4[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2.
It is easy to verify that this inequality holds true for both β = 1 (with equality) and
β = 0. As the coefficient in front of the β2 term of the RHS is positive for α > 0, the
inequality has therefore to hold for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
When firm 2 starts an online channel, it is better for firm 1 not to do likewise iff
[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2
9(1 + β)
≥ β
2
+
α2(1− β)
4
− f/t.
For f = 0, this reduces to
4[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2 ≥ 18β(1 + β) + 9α2(1− β2).
It is easy to verify that this inequality holds true for both β = 1 (with equality) and
β = 0. If we bring all terms to the LHS the coefficient in front of β2 is negative,
implying that the inequality has to hold for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
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Calculations establishing the equilibrium structure in Section 3.3 when λ > 1
When firm 2 does not start an online channel, it is better for firm 1 to do likewise
iff
1
2
≥ [2− α+ (1 + α)β]
2
9(1 + β)
− f/t.
In this case, the inequality can be rewritten asµ
1 + 2
f
t
¶
9(1 + β) ≥ 2[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2.
The upper curve in Figure 2 depicts this relation in case we replace the inequality by
an equality sign and f/t = 0.01.
When firm 2 starts an online channel, it is better for firm 1 not to do likewise iff
[1 + α+ (2− α)β]2
9(1 + β)
≥ β
2
− f/t.
The lower curve in Figure 2 depicts this relation when f/t = 0.01 and when replacing
the inequality by an equality sign.
First-order conditions Section 4.1.
There are three first-order conditions, one for each firm. As firms 1 and 2 are in
a symmetric position and we are looking for symmetric equilibria, we only give the
first-order conditions for firm 1 and 3:
(1− λ)v − 2p1c + p3E +
βt
2
= 0;
t− 2(1− λ)v + p1c + p2c − 4p3E − βt = 0;
Imposing symmetry (p1c = p2c) we can solve these two equations and obtain the
subgame equilibrium prices given in Proposition 3.
First-order conditions Section 4.2.
In case λ < 1, there are five first-order conditions, two for firms 1 and 2 and
one for firm 3. As firms 1 and 2 are in a symmetric position and we are looking for
symmetric equilibria, we only give the first-order conditions for firm 1 and 3, taking
p1E and p1c− p1E as choice variables:
p1c − p1E =
(1− λ)v
2
;
1
2
− 2p1E − p3E
βt
= 0;
p1E + p2E − 4p3E = 0;
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Imposing symmetry (p1c = p2c and p1E = p2E) we can solve these three equations
and obtain the subgame equilibrium prices given in the main text.
First-order conditions Section 4.3.
In case λ < 1, there are four first-order conditions, two for firm 1, one for firm 2
and one for firm 3:
p1c − p1E −
(1− λ)v
2
= 0;
1
2
− 2p1E − p3E
βt
= 0;
(1− λ)v − 2p2c + p3E +
βt
2
= 0;
1
2
−
(1− λ)v − p2c + 2p3E + βt2
t
+
p1E − 2p3E
βt
= 0;
Conditions 2 and 3 together imply that p2c = p1E+
(1−λ)v
2
. It is important to note
that this is independent of whether or not the first-order condition holds, i.e., in case
λ > 1 and the first condition does not hold the second firm’s offline price is still the
usual mark-up over the online price. Substituting this equation for p2c into the fourth
first-order condition and using the second yields
1
2
−
(1−λ)v
2
+ 3
2
p3E +
βt
4
t
+
1
2
p3E +
βt
4
− 2p3E
βt
= 0.
This can be solved for the subgame perfect equilibrium value of p3E given in the
Proposition. Substituting this value into the second and third condition yields the
subgame perfect equilibrium values of p1E and p2c. The expressions for equilibrium
profits, can be obtained by substituting the equilibrium prices in the expression for
profits given in the text.
Section 5: The entrant’s incentive to enter are monotone in the number of in-
cumbents with an online channel
On the basis of Table 3 we first show for the case when λ < 1 or the case where
λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0 that the operating profits of the entrant
are larger when no incumbent has an online channel than when one of them has one.
This is the case when23
8(1 + β)[1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β]2 > β[3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β]2.
23In case λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) < 0, the inequality takes the form 8(1 + β)[1−
α+(α− 12)β]
2 > 9β. Straightforward calculations show that whenever this inequality is relevant, it
holds.
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As β/(1 + β) < 1/2, it follows that this is certainly the case when
1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β >
3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β
4
.
One can easily verify that this is the case if α < 1/2.
Next, we show that the operating profits of the entrant are larger when one
incumbent has an online channel than when both of them have one.24 This is the
case when
[3− 2α+ (2α− 1)β]2 > 2(1 + β).
As the LHS is decreasing in α, this inequality certainly holds if it holds for α = 1/2.
Substituting this into the inequality yields 4 > 2(1 + β), which holds for all β < 1.
Section 5.1: If f is to large for the entrant to enter in case the incumbents have
no online retail channel, then incumbent will not start an online retail channel either
We have to show that π3(n, n, y) < 0 implies π1(y, n, n) < π1(n, n, n). This is the
case when 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−α(1−β)]2
9
< f/t implies [(2+β)t−α(1−β)]
2
9(1+β) − f/t <
1
2
. This implication
holds true if
(1 + β){2− 2β + 1
2
β2 − 4α(1− β)(1− 1
2
β) + α2(1− β)2}+ 9
2
(1 + β)
> 4 + 4β + β2 − 4α(1− β)(1 + 1
2
β) + α2(1− β)2.
This inequality can be rewritten as 21
2
+ 1
2
β−21
2
β2+ 1
2
β3+2αβ2+α2β(1−β)2 > 0.
The terms involving α reach a minimum value of -β3 at α = −β/(1− β). Given this,
it is easily seen that the inequality always holds true.
Section 5.1: Entry deterrence when the entrant enters if, and only if, no incumbent
sells online
We have to show that π3(n, n, y) > 0 implies π1(y, n, n) > π1(n, n, y) > 0. In case
λ < 1 (and when λ > 1) this implication certainly holds true if 2[(1−
1
2
β)t−(1−λ)v]2
9t > f
implies [(2+β)t−(1−λ)v]
2
9(1+β)t − f >
[(1−λ)v+( 1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9t . This can be rewritten as
[2− α+ (1 + α)β]2
9(1 + β)
>
[1
2
+ α+ (1
2
− α)β]2
9
+
2[1− α+ (α− 1
2
)β]2
9
The LHS of this inequality is certainly larger than (2 − α)2/9, while the RHS is
certainly smaller than (1+2(1−α)2/9. It is easily seen that (2−α)2 > 1+2(1−α)2
for all values of α < 1/2.
Coordination issue between incumbents when the entrant enters if, and only if, at
24In this case the relevant expressions for the entrant’s pay-off are independent of whether or not
λ < 1.
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most one incumbent firm has started an electronic channel (Section 5.1).
We have to show two things: (i) π3(y, y, y) < 0 and α > 0 implies π1(n, n, y) >
π1(y, n, y) and (ii) π3(y, n, y) > 0 implies π1(n, y, y) < π1(y, y, n)
(i) The first implication says f > βt
18
implies [(1−λ)v+(
1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9t >
[(1−λ)v]2
4(1−β)t +
β[(3+β)t−(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t −
f . We think of the LHS and the RHS of this inequality as function of α. We prove
three facts: (a) When α = 0, the implication holds true if the following inequality
holds: (1+β)
2
36
>
β(3+β)2
36(1+β)2 −
β
18
, which can be rewritten as 1− 3β +4β2 +5β3 + β4 > 0,
which holds for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; (b) When α = 1/2, the implication holds true if
the following inequality holds: 1
9
>
β(5+3β)2
144(1+β)2 +
1−β
16
− β
18
, which can be rewritten as
16(1 + β)2 > β(5 + 3β)2 + 9(1− β)− 8β, or, −β3 − 14β2 + 24β + 7 > 0, which also
holds for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1; (c) Further, it is easy to evaluate the derivative of both LHS
and RHS with respect to α. The derivative of the LHS is positive on the relevant
domain of α, whereas the derivative of the RHS is first negative and then positive.
These three facts together imply that the implication always holds.
When λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0, the implication does not need
to hold. To see this note that the implication holds if, and only if, [α(1−β)+(
1
2
+ 1
2
β)t]2
9
>
β[(3+β)t−α(1−β)]2
36(1+β)2 −
β
18
. One may check that for example when α = −1/2 and β = 0.4
the inequality does not hold.
(ii) In case λ < 1 the second implication certainly holds true if β[(3−β)t−2(1−λ)v]
2
36(1+β)t >
f implies [(3β+β
2)t+(3+2β)(1−λ)v]2
36(1+β)2t <
βt
2
+ [(1−λ)v]
2
4(1−β)t − f. This implication holds true if
β
2
+
α2(1− β)
4
>
[(3β + β2) + α(3 + 2β)(1− β)]2
36(1 + β)2
+
β[3− 2α+ 2(α− 1)β]2
36(1 + β)
As the last term of the RHS is decreasing in β, this term is smaller than β/4 when
α > 0, and thus, this inequality holds if
β
4
+
α(1− β)
4
µ
α− α(3 + 2β)
2(1− β)
9(1 + β)2
− 2β(3 + 2β)(3 + β)
9(1 + β)2
¶
>
β2(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
.
As the term on the LHS in brackets is increasing in α, this is certainly the case when
β
4
− α(1− β)
4
2β(3 + 2β)(3 + β)
9(1 + β)2
>
β2(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
.
As α < 1/2, it is a straightforward exercise to show this is the case.
Similar calculations hold when λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) > 0.25 In
25When λ > 1 and α(3 + 2β)(1− β) + β(3 + β) < 0 the implication reads as βt/4− f > 0 implies
βt/2− f > 0,which obviously holds true.
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this case the implication holds when
β
2
>
[(3β + β2) + α(3 + 2β)(1− β)]2
36(1 + β)2
+
β[3− 2α+ 2(α− 1)β]2
36(1 + β)
.
As the first term of the RHS is increasing in α and as 0 > α > −1/2, this inequality
certainly holds if
1
2
>
β(3 + β)2
36(1 + β)2
+
16β
36(1 + β)
.
It is straightforward to show that this is always the case.
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